RBAC ClusterRoleBindings that bind to the cluster-admin ClusterRole are identified, showing where subjects receive super-user permissions across all namespaces.
Risk
Excessive cluster-admin grants give full API control, risking:
- Secret exfiltration (confidentiality)
- RBAC tampering (integrity)
- Destructive actions causing outages (availability)
A compromised subject can escalate, persist via new bindings, and laterally impact all namespaces.
prowler kubernetes --checks rbac_cluster_admin_usage
Recommendation
Apply least privilege: replace cluster-admin with narrowly scoped Roles/ClusterRoles and bind per namespace. Reserve super-user access for break-glass, time-bound with approval and audit. Enforce separation of duties, review RBAC regularly, and monitor role/binding changes for defense in depth.
Remediation
kubectl delete clusterrolebinding <example_resource_name>
- List ClusterRoleBindings that use cluster-admin:
kubectl get clusterrolebindings -o json | jq -r '.items[] | select(.roleRef.name=="cluster-admin") | .metadata.name' - For each name returned, delete the binding:
kubectl delete clusterrolebinding <example_resource_name> - If access is still required, recreate with least privilege (example uses view):
kubectl create clusterrolebinding <example_resource_name> --clusterrole=view --user=<example_resource_id>
Source Code
Resource Type
ClusterRoleBinding